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THE RESPONSIBLE THING TO DO ABOUT "RESPONSIBLE
PARTY" PROVISIONS IN NURSING HOME AGREEMENTS:
A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE ON THREE FRONTSt
Katherine C. Pearson*
Nursing homes routinely seek the signature of a family member on nursing home
agreements, calling the signer a "responsible party" or sponsor for the resident.
Federal Medicare and Medicaid law provides that participating facilities must
"not require a third party guarantee of payment to the facility as a condition of
admission ... to, or continued stay, in the facility. "Nonetheless, if ederal bene-
fits prove to be unavailable, courts are holding responsible parties contractually
liable for thousands of dollars for the care of their elders. This Article proposes
private and public responses to the increasing likelihood that nursing homes will
seek collection from family members.
I. INTRODUCTION
When your next family picnic gets a bit dull, consider offering
this question to liven up the crowd: "Do you think we ought to
have a law that makes us liable for family members who cannot af-
ford nursing homes?" Remember to mention that, on average,
nursing homes cost in excess of $5,000 per month.' If that does not
generate enough response, you can fuel the debate with a disclo-
sure that a surprising number of states do have laws that purport to
hold adult children responsible for the support of their indigent
t © 2004 by Katherine C. Pearson. All rights reserved.Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law of The Pennsylvania State Univer-
sity; B.A. 1994, University of Arizona; J.D. 1979, University of Miami School of Law. The
author is grateful for the research and editorial assistance of Amy Smith and Crystal Stryker
and for the hard work of the certified legal interns in the Elder Law Clinic at The Dickinson
School of Law in representing older clients faced with difficult legal issues arising out of
long term care. I also appreciate the guidance on agency principles provided by Professors
Lance Cole, Michael Navin, William A. Gregory, and Gary S. Rosin, and thank the AALS
Section on Agency, Partnerships and Limited Liability Entities for the opportunity to pre-
sent my topic in January 2004.
1. See THE METLIFE MARKET SURVEY OF NURSING HOME & HOME CARE
COSTS (Aug. 2003), available at http://www.metlife.com/Applications/Corporate/WPS/
CDA/PageGenerator/0,1674,P2801,00.html (on file with the University of Michigan Jour-
nal of Law Reform) (demonstrating that the national average for a private room is $5,512
per month, while a semi-private room costs $4,813 per month); see also Pa. Dep't of Pub.
Welfare, Policy Clarification PMN-10991-440 (June 19, 2003) (according to the Pennsylvania
Department of Public Welfare, as of July 1, 2003, Pennsylvania's average monthly nursing
home cost for private care was $5,559).
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parents. Such statutes, sometimes called "filial responsibility laws"
or "family responsibility laws,"3 are controversial and are the sub-
ject both of scholarly criticism and inconsistent enforcement
efforts. Indeed, writing about the practical, moral and constitu-
tional implications of filial responsibility laws is almost a cottage
industry for the growing world of family and elder law scholars.
Such statutes change the common law-and challenge the com-
mon assumption of the public-that adult children have no legal
obligations to support their aging family members.5
As a practical matter, the use of state filial responsibility laws as a
direct means to compel families to pay for nursing home care is
blocked by federal regulations governing Medicaid. Federal law
prohibits the states from considering "income and resources of any
[applicant's] relative as available to an [applicant]"6 in determin-
ing a person's eligibility for Medicaid. This provision is one of a
number of provisions tying Medicaid eligibility to the prospective
resident's inability to pay, without consideration of the resources of
adult children or grandchildren. These provisions are representa-
tive of a national public policy against forcing an individual's
2. Shannon Frank Edelstone, Filial Responsibility: Can the Legal Duty to Support Our Par-
ents Be Effectively Enforced, 36 FAM. L.Q. 501,502 n.8 (2002).
3. See, e.g., Americana Healthcare Ctr. v. Randall, 513 N.W.2d 566, 571 (S.D. 1994)
(holding son liable for indigent mother's nursing home care under state responsibility
statute); Presbyterian Med. Ctr. v. Budd, 832 A.2d 1066, 1076 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (permit-
ting nursing home to assert claim for equitable support and restitution against daughter for
cost of mother's care, based- on Pennsylvania statute). Pennsylvania is one of thirty states that
have some form of filial responsibility statute on their books. See 62 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 1973 (1996).
4. See, e.g., Ann Britton, America's Best Kept Secret: An Adult Child's Duty to Support Aged
Parents, 26 CAL. W.L. REv. 351 (1990); Catherine Doscher Byrd, Relative Responsibility Ex-
tended: Requirement of Adult Children to Pay for Their Indigent Parent's Medical Needs, 22 FAM.
L.Q. 87 (1988); Michael Rosenbaum, Are Family Responsibility Laws Constitutional?, 1 FAM.
L.Q. 55 (1967); LeoJ. Tully, Family Responsibility Laws: An Unwise and Unconstitutional Imposi-
tion, 5 FAM. L.Q. 32 (1971).
5. See generally, Tully, supra note 4.
6. 42 C.F.R. § 435.602(a)(1) (2003). Separate rules exist for married couples, includ-
ing allocation of a portion of the couple's marital assets, called "resources," to the
institutionalized spouse's care. However, once the spouse becomes a facility resident, only
the resident's "income" is considered when determining eligibility for Medicaid. In addi-
tion, some protections exist to avoid forced "impoverishment" of the "community spouse."
See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5 (2000); see also Wis. Dep't of Health & Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534
U.S. 473, 495 (2002) (confirming state's discretion in handling spousal impoverishment
calculations under Medicaid); Comm'r of Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y. v. Spellman, 661
N.Y.S.2d 895, 990 (App. Div. 1997) (permitting recovery by state from community spouse
who refused to contribute support for wife's nursing home care under state's formula for
resource allocation).
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extended family to bear the costs of that individual's long-term
7
care.
Nonetheless, nursing homes frequendy seek to secure a type of
contractual "filial responsibility" and, indeed, to extend this re-
sponsibility to anyone who signs the nursing home admission
contract on behalf of the incapacitated resident. Despite state and
federal laws which attempt to prohibit nursing homes from man-
dating third-party "guarantee" agreements as a condition of care,"
there are financial traps for people who believe they are acting
merely as facilitators in the admission process. Where gaps arise in
private or public financing of the resident's nursing home stay,
courts are holding third-party signers personally liable.9 In one no-
table example, a daughter found herself personally liable for more
the $75,000 in nursing home costs. 10 As strains on public financing
increase, so too do the incentives for nursing homes to create ave-
nues for private responsibility."
The decision to enter a nursing home is rarely a happy event for
the resident or the resident's family. It has long been recognized
that one of the best assurances of quality care is not mere money,
but the active participation of family members in the resident's
ongoing life in the nursing home. 2 However, family members who
feel trapped-or tricked-by a nursing home into paying for care
involuntarily, are unlikely to feel comfortable about staying active
in their elders' lives. 13 Alternatively, a son or daughter who is
7. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(c)(5)(A)(ii) (2000); id. § 1396r(c)(5)(A)(ii) (2000),
discussion infra Part II.
8. See id.
9. See, e.g., Holloway v. Riley's Oak Hill Manor, Inc., No. CA 02-74, 2002 WL
31259803, at *34 (Ark. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2002) (holding son liable under contract terms);
Putnam Nursing & Rehab. Ctr. v. Bowles, 658 N.Y.S.2d 57, 59 (App. Div. 1997) (holding
trustees liable under contract terms); Southport Manor Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. Kundrath,
No. CV91-0284958, 1994 WL 621895, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 28, 1994) (holding son
liable under contract terms); St. Francis Home v. Sharon, No. 93-0523, 1993 WL 388290, at
*1 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 1993) (holding son liable under contract terms); Daughters of
Sarah Nursing Home Co. v. Lipkin, 535 N.Y.S.2d 790, 790 (App. Div. 1988) (holding son
liable under contract terms).
10. Sunrise Healthcare Corp. v. Azarigian, 821 A.2d 835, 841 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003)
(holding daughter liable under contract terms).
11. Nathalie D. Martin & Elizabeth Rourke, Les Jeux Ne Sont Pas Faits: The Right to Dig-
nified Long-Term Care in the Face of Industry-Wide Financial Failure, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 129 (2000) (analyzing impact of Balanced Budget Act of 1997 on public funding).
12. See, e.g., CHRIS ADAMEC, THE UNOFFICIAL GUIDE TO ELDERCARE (1999); ROBERT F.
BORNSTEIN & MARY A. LANGUIRAND, WHEN SOMEONE You LOVE NEEDS NURSING HOME,
ASSISTED LIVING, OR IN-HOME CARE: THE COMPLETE GUIDE (2002).
13. See Michael Farley, Note, When "IDo" Becomes "I Don't": Eliminating the Divorce Loop-
hole to Medicaid Eligibility, 9 ELDER L.J. 27 (2001) (discussing the possibility of divorce for
couples facing long term care costs).
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struggling to provide care at home may hesitate to place an elder
into appropriate long-term care because of uncertainty about
liability for future costs.'l A sound approach to third-party
representation is needed to facilitate high quality care and to
maintain the resident's and the family's relationship.
This Article highlights the confusion surrounding the current
legal status of third-party signers, usually called "Responsible Par-
ties" in nursing home agreements. The process of admitting
someone to a nursing home raises important policy questions
about public financing, family responsibility, traditional agency
theories, and contract interpretation. This Article demonstrates
the importance of providing sound legal advice to residents and
their families prior to admission, the need for careful considera-
tion by the courts of collection cases brought against third-party
signers, and, ultimately, the need for legislative clarification or re-
form.
5
II. FEDERAL LAW SETS THRESHOLD STANDARDS
In 1986, the Institute of Medicine 16 completed a comprehensive
inquiry into nursing home practices throughout the country and
published a report with strong recommendations for changes
needed to address serious and chronic problems in nursing home
care. 17 In 1987, Congress responded by adopting the Nursing
Home Reform Act that affects all nursing homes that participate in
Medicare or Medicaid funding."' Congress sought to establish
threshold standards for residents' safety, privacy, freedom from
14. Joel C. Dobris, Medicaid Asset Planning By the Elderly: A Policy View of Expectations, En-
titlement and Inheritance, 24 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.J. 1, 8 (1989).
15. This Article will also demonstrate, without resolving, the potential for a classic, po-
tential "Elder Law" conflict of interest for the lawyer who represents the prospective
resident while advising the prospective "responsible party." See, e.g., David M. Rosenfeld,
Whose Decision Is It Anyway? Identifying the Medicaid Planning Client, 6 ELDER LJ. 383 (1998).
16. The Institute of Medicine (IoM) is a nonprofit organization chartered in 1970 as a
component of the National Academy of Sciences. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE website, avail-
able at http://www.iom.
17. COMMITTEE ON NURSING HOME REGULATION, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, IMPROVING
THE QUALITY OF CARE IN NURSING HOMES (1986) [hereinafter IoM NURSING HOME RE-
PORT]; see also Estate of Smith v. Heckler, 747 F.2d 583, 591 (10th Cir. 1984) (granting
mandamus relief and finding federal agency had duty to establish and enforce regulations
regarding patient care in nursing homes receiving Medicaid money).
18. See Sen. Charles Grassley, The Resurrection of Nursing Home Reform: A Historical Ac-
count of the Recent Revival of the Quality of Care Standards for Long-Term Care Facilities Established
in the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1987, 7 ELDER L.J. 267 (1999).
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restraints and individual autonomy. " In addition to federal regula-
tion,2 ° nursing homes are subject to state regulation.21
One overarching goal of the federal regulatory scheme is to
curb disparate treatment between public and private pay residents
of nursing homes.22 Federal law provides that a nursing facility
"must establish and maintain identical policies and practices re-
garding ... covered services ... for all individuals regardless of
source of payment."" However, because Medicare and Medicaid
also set limits on the amounts that the government reimburses fa-
cilities for the cost of care, nursing homes Rrefer the higher
income often generated by private pay patients. In an attempt to
protect potential Medicaid residents from manipulation by nursing
homes, the Nursing Home Reform Act prohibits facilities from re-
quiring residents to "waive" rights to seek Medicare or Medicaid25
coverage and bars them from seeking promises from residents
26
not to apply for these lower limits of coverage. Indeed, nursing
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(c)(4) (2000) (regarding resident rights under Medicare); see
also, id. § 1396r(c)(4) (2000) (containing similar language governing resident rights for
nursing homes participating in Medical Assistance, also known as Medicaid).
20. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 483.1-483.75 (2002).
21. Federal law permits the states to impose more stringent admission rules aimed at
curbing discriminatory treatment of Medicaid residents. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(c) (5) (B) (i)
(2000) (specifying that there is no federal preemption of stricter state standards for admis-
sions policies for Medicare); id. § 1396r(c) (5) (B) (i) (2000) (specifying that there is no
federal preemption of stricter state standards for admissions policies for Medicaid); see, e.g.,
28 PA. CODE §§ 201.1-201.31, 201.3 (2000) (showing Pennsylvania regulations use the term
"responsible person" to refer to someone who is not an employee of the facility and who "is
responsible for making decisions on behalf of the resident."). Curiously, although Pennsyl-
vania regulations incorporate by reference many of the federal resident rights, Pennsylvania
has adopted no specific state policy on third-party guarantees or responsible party provi-
sions in nursing home agreements. See 28 PA. CODE §§ 201.2(4) (2000) (Requirements),
201.24 (2000) (Admission policy), 201.29 (2000) (Resident rights).
22. Although the Institute of Medicine strongly urged major federal regulatory
changes, noting the inconsistency in standards and problems with nursing home care across
the nation, the 1986 study was unable to document a clear correlation between sources of
payment (public or private) and quality. See IoM NURSING HOME REPORT, supra note 17, at
193-96. IoM recommended further study of the "complex relationships among costs,
charges, reimbursement, and quality." Id. at 195.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(c)(4) (2000) (regarding Equal Access to Quality Care for
Medicare patients); id. § 1396r(c) (4) (A) (2000) (regarding Equal Access to Quality Care for
Medicaid patients).
24. IoM NURSING HOME REPORT, supra note 17, at 194 ("Because Medicaid rates are as
much as 30 percent lower than private rates for comparable residents in some states, there
is a clear incentive to try to attract and keep as many private-pay residents as possible."). The
rates that Medicaid pays for services within a particular state are set by that state, using fed-
eral guidelines. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a) (30) (2000); 42 C.ER. §§ 447.200, 447.204 (2002).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(c)(5)(A)(i)(I) (2000) (Medicare); id. § 1396r(c) (5) (A) (i) (I)
(2000) (Medicaid).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(c)(5)(A)(i)(II) (2000); id. § 1396r(c)(5)(A)(i)(II) (2000).
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homes are required to advertise and educate residents about how
to apply for Medicare and Medicaid coverage.27
For family members and others assisting a resident in the admis-
sion to nursing homes, an important provision of federal law
expressly prohibits any nursing home certified as eligible for Medi-
care or Medicaid reimbursement from requiring guarantees as a
condition of admission or extended care. In both the Medicare and
Medicaid provisions, the key statutory language is set forth at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(c) (5) (A) (ii), 1396r(c) (5) (A) (ii) (hereinafter Sub-
section (A)(ii)) specifying: "With respect to admissions practices, a
skilled nursing facility must... not require a third party guarantee
of payment to the facility as a condition of admission (or expedited
admission) to, or continued stay in, the facility.""
This language, standing alone, plainly prohibits facilities from
conditioning admission upon a third party's guarantee of the pri-
vate pay costs-but the question arising in litigation is whether
federal law renders third-party payor provisions presumptively un-
enforceable.29 The interpretation of the statutory restriction on
guarantees is affected by additional language in the federal statutes
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(c) (5) (B) (ii), 1396r(c) (5) (B) (ii) (hereinaf-
ter Subsection (B) (ii)), providing that Medicare and Medicaid
qualified facilities may "requir[e] an individual, who has legal ac-
cess to a resident's income or resources available to pay for care in
the facility, to sign a contract (without incurring personal financial
liability) to provide payment from the resident's income or re-
,,30
sources for such care.
During admission, the prospective resident may be over-
whelmed by physical or mental illness, or by the prospect of being
asked to sign a host of documents. Many documents seek the sig-
nature of the resident but permit a third party to sign,3 1 and as a
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(c)(5)(A)(i)(llI) (2000); id. § 1396r(c)(5) (A) (i)(III) (2000).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(c)(5)(A)(ii) (2000); id. § 1396r(c)(5) (A)(ii) (2000).
29. See, e.g., Slovik v. Prime Healthcare Corp., 838 So. 2d 1054, 1057 n.2 (Ala. Civ. App.
2002) (noting nursing home's concession that it was not trying to collect stepfather's debt
from personal representative as a guarantor because Medicaid regulations "prohibited it
from requiring [the step-son] to guarantee his stepfather's obligation to them ....").
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(c)(5)(B)(ii) (2000); id. § 1396r(c)(5)(B)(ii) (2000); see also 42
C.F.R. § 483.12(d)(2) (2002).
31. See COMMONWEALTH OF PA. DEP'T OF PUB. WELFARE, ADMISSIONS NOTICE PACKET
(2000), available at http://www.dpw.state.pa.us/omap/provinf/maforms/omapma40l.pdf
(on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform) (mandating an "Admissions
Notice Packet," PA Form MA 401 (7-96), currently twenty-plus pages of rights and responsi-
bilities, for all admissions to nursing home in Pennsylvania). The document describes the
Commonwealth's "Admission Policy" on the liability of third-party signers only in the nega-
tive, vaguely suggesting that as long as the resident is "entitled to medical assistance," (not,
however, referring to "Medical Assistance" or "Medicaid," the capitalized words used else-
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practical matter nursing homes want the signatures of third par-
ties. Many of these documents use the term "Responsible Party" or
"Sponsor" for third-party designations. The third party is often
acting with, at best, a layperson's understanding of his or her role,
while the nursing home expects that person to function in multi-
ple capacities, including the role of health care agent, financial
agent, and, if possible, as guarantor of payment. 3 A growing body
of case law demonstrates significant consequences for the use of
"Responsible Party" or similar language in nursing home agree-
ments.
III. CASE LAW SIGNALS PROBLEMS WITH
"RESPONSIBLE PARTY" PROVISIONS
A. Enforceability of Responsible Party Guarantee Provisions
Following passage of the Nursing Home Reform Act, leading
advocates of resident rights took the position that contracts that
routinely include third-party guarantee provisions are inherently
illegal and unenforceable. 4 In some instances, nursing homes give
lip service to this notion, by denying the allegation they are seek-
ing to make or enforce third-party guarantee agreements, even as
where in the document to refer to public benefits programs), no one may be required to
guarantee any payments. Id. at 4.
32. See Katherine C. Pearson, Traps for the Unwary in Nursing Home Agreements: Guaran-
tor Mere Agent or Separate Promisor, 74 PA. B. ASS'N Q. 139, 141-42 (2003) (analyzing
"Responsible Party" provisions used in Pennsylvania nursing home contracts).
33. The understanding of the role of the "Responsible Party" as a health care agent is
noted in some nursing home-related, non-collection cases. See, e.g., Boyer v. Grandview
Manor Care Ctr., Inc., 759 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) ("A responsible party is
usually a friend, family member or guardian who looks out for the interests of a resident of
the nursing home, making major decisions for them, such as the decision to retain or ter-
minate the services of a resident's physician.").
34. AARP, WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT NURSING HOME ADMISSION CONTRACTS
(AARP 2003)("Using terms such as responsible party or guarantor, which impose personal
liability for the cost of the resident's care, is illegal for residents receiving Medicaid and unen-
forceable for privately paying residents."); see also Eric M. Carlson, Admission Agreements: Illegal
Provisions, LONG-TERM CARE Avoc. (MB), § 3.06[2] at 3-40 (2003) (arguing that for "at least
three reasons, these 'Responsible Party' provisions are illegal and/or unenforceable"); BET
TZEDEK LEGAL SERVS. ET AL., "IF ONLY I HAD KNOWN": MISREPRESENTATIONS BY NURSING
HOMES WHICH DEPRIVE RESIDENTS OF LEGAL PROTECTION (1998); Patricia Nemore, Illegal
Terms in Nursing Home Admission Contracts, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1165 (1985); Charles
Sabatino, Nursing Home Admission: Contracts Undermining Rights the Old-Fashioned Way, 24 CLEAR-
INGHOUSE REv. 553 (1990).
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they seek to hold third parties liable for nursing home costs.
When faced with the question of whether Subsection (A) (ii)' of
the federal Medicare and Medicaid laws makes third-party guaran-
tee contracts illegal or unenforceable, the courts have either
avoided the question all together,s7 or, as discussed below, con-
cluded that under federal law third parties may volunteer to sign as
guarantors of payment to the nursing homes.
In 1992, individual family members, on behalf of themselves and
others, filed suit seeking a declaration that a particular California-
based nursing home's form agreements containing third-party
guarantee language "pressured and deceived family members of
'private pay' patients ... into cosigning as responsible parties in
contravention of both federal and state law." 38 Interestingly, during
the course of litigating Podolsky v. First Healthcare Corp., the nursing
home revised its standard agreements and removed the third-party
guarantee language from the standard contract used for Medicaid
residents, but also created a separate guarantee contract for use
with private pay patients. The plaintiffs, relying on the language
of Subsection (A) (ii) of the federal Medicare and Medicaid stat-
utes,4° continued to litigate the issue of the validity of the third-
party juarantee language in the contracts used for private pay pa-
tients. At the trial court level, summary judgment was entered in
favor of the nursing home based upon a conclusion that "the pro-
posed new guarantee agreement by its terms neither violated or
subverted federal or state law and was not deceptive.
4
1
In analyzing the federal provisions precluding nursing homes
from "requiring" a third-party guarantee, the intermediate
California appellate court accepted the proposition that whatever
the proper interpretation of the federal law, the rules applied
equally to Medicaid or private pay residents and their
35. See, e.g., Slovik v. Prime Healthcare Corp., 838 So. 2d 1054, 1057 n.2 (Ala. Civ. App.
2002) (noting nursing home's concession that it was not trying to collect stepfather's debt
from personal representative as a guarantor because Medicaid regulations "prohibited it
from requiring [the step-son] to guarantee his stepfather's obligation to them . .. ");
Wedgewood Care Ctr. Inc. v. McGloin, No. 2002-82 N C, 2002 WL 31956103, at *1 (N.Y.
App. Div. Sept. 20, 2002) (noting that in suit for breach of contract brought against resi-
dent's widow, nursing home "expressly set forth that it does not seek to hold defendant
liable as a guarantor.").
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(c)(5)(A)(i) (II) (2000); id. § 1396r(c) (5) (A) (i) (II) (2000).
37. See infra Part III.B.
38. Podolsky v. First Healthcare Corp., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89,94 (Ct. App. 1996).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 96 (noting plaintiffs' reliance on 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3 (c) (5) (A) (ii) (2000) and
42 U.S.C. § 1396r(c) (5) (A) (ii) (2000)).
41. Podolsky, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 96.




representatives. However, contrary to the position of the plaintiffs
and national advocates, the court found that "solicitation of
otherwise voluntary third party guarantors" does not violate or
subvert federal law." Thus, the court drew a distinction between
voluntary and non-voluntary guarantee commitments:
Neither federal nor [California] state law prohibits nursing
homes from voluntarily obtaining the signature of a willing
responsible party or third party guarantor when admitting
nursing home residents. Instead, the applicable statutes make
it unlawful to require third party guarantees as a condition of
admission or continued residence in such facilities.... Had
Congress intended to forbid third party guarantees under any
circumstances, we presume it would have said so. State law,
meanwhile, expressly states that the signature of third party
guarantors may be obtained.45
The court noted that the California nursing home's revised
agreements contained recitations that execution of the guarantee
was not "required."46 Although rejecting the plaintiffs' position that
the guarantee contracts were inherently illegal and unenforceable,
the court nonetheless reversed the summary judgment in favor of
the nursing home, finding that factual issues existed as to whether
or not the facility's approaches to soliciting signatures on the new
guarantee contracts were "deceptive."47 The court credited testi-
mony that seems consistent with accounts of admissions processes
widely reported throughout the country:
Appellants' declarations, from several persons who admitted
family members to various FHC nursing homes over a three-
year period, portray an admissions process in which a stack of
documents was hurriedly presented with little or no explana-
tion. Family members were simply directed where to sign, by
"V or check marks which had already been added by the
FHC employee handling the admissions process. In one case,
the son of a newly-admitted resident was expressly told that
43. Id. at 96.
44. Id. at 97.
45. Id. (citation omitted).
46. Podosky, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 97.
47. Id.
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his signature as a responsible person was required. In allS 481
cases, the term was never explained.
The appellate court remanded for further proceedings under
California's Unfair Competition Act, which granted the courts au-
thority to enter orders necessary to prevent future deceptive or
unfair business practices.49
The Podolsky decision is important because it recognizes that ab-
sent regulatory supervision, nursing homes have little incentive to
provide clear information to the representatives of prospective
residents about the alternatives to signing a guarantee. The court
makes it clear that mere recitations in a document about the vol-
untariness of the third party's signature are not enough to assure
compliance with the public policy set forth in Subsection (A) (ii) of
the Medicare and Medicaid provisions, which is to prevent nursing
homes from manipulating families into signing guarantees of pri-51
vate payment. Even where the contract presented to the third
party includes express warnings, "the issue is whether that solicita-
tion is deceptive or not."
52
Thus, a factual issue is often created by the context in which
admissions documents, containing any form of promissory lan-
guage, are submitted to and signed by third parties. Even though
the California court in Podolsky declined to validate the frequently
stated position of advocates that third-party guarantee contracts
are inherently illegal and unenforceable under federal law,53 and
even though other courts have similarly declined to read the fed-
eral statutes broadly,54 the decision serves as persuasive precedent
48. Id. at 101-02; see also Holloway v. Riley's Oak Hill Manor, Inc., No. CA 02-74, 2002
WL 31259803, at *1 (Ark. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2002), discussion infra Part III.B; cf Corley v.
Rosewood Care Ctr., Inc. of Peoria, 142 F.3d 1041, 1050 (7th Cir. 1998) (discussing allega-
tions that nursing home made representations to prospective residents and families about
scope of care, as evidence relevant to RICO suit).
49. Podolsky, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 104.
50. Id. at 104, (noting the court's power under state law to enter orders necessary to
prevent future deceptive practices and recommending "[t]he court and the parties might
also consider allowing the solicitation of third party guarantees no sooner than one day after
the admission agreement is signed to clearly separate the admission documents from the
third party guarantee agreement").
51. Id. at 97; see also 42 C.F.R. § 435.602(a) (1) (2003); supra text accompanying note 6.
52. Podolsky, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 97.
53. Id. at 96.
54. See, e.g., SWA, Inc. v. Straka, No. 82103, 2003 WL 21434637, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App.
June 19, 2003) (noting that federal and state law prohibit nursing homes from requiring a
guarantee as a condition of admission but a signed guarantee may be enforceable in the
absence of representations that the facility required a guarantor).
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for courts to examine critically the voluntariness of third-party sig-
55
natures on admission contracts.
B. Interpretation of Responsible Party Promises
Two recent cases suggest another analytical approach to "Re-
sponsible Party" provisions in nursing home contracts, and
demonstrate the courts' divided response to the problem of defin-
56ing the roles played by third parties during nursing home care.
The opinions are thoughtfully written, but these opinions, and a
surprising number of recent decisions interpreting responsible
party obligations, are unofficially reported, thus suggesting some
hesitancy on the part of courts in reaching the bottom line on li-
ability for third-party signers of nursing home agreements.
In Holloway v. Riley's Oak Hill Manor, Inc., an Arkansas
intermediate appellate court affirmed a trial court's ruling that the
adult son was contractually bound to pay for his elderly mother's
nursing home care, during recovery from a broken hip, by signing
his name on the line for "responsible party" in two admissions
documents that provided, "The patient and/or responsible party
agrees to pay a daily rate of [blank] and the Nursing home will
accept this agreement in full consideration for care and services
rendered., 57 By contrast, in Special Care Nursing Services Inc. v. Fox, a
Massachusetts appellate court ruled that the adult granddaughter
who signed on the line for "Client/Responsible Party" was not
contractually bound for the uninsured cost of her grandmother's
nursing home care, despite the provision of the document that
stated, "I agree to assume responsibility for and guarantee the
payment of any and all sums that become due [to the extent not
55. See, e.g., REBECCA J. BENSON, CHECK YOUR RIGHTS AT THE DOOR: CONSUMER PRO-
TECTION VIOLATIONS IN MASSACHUSETTS NURSING HOME ADMISSION AGREEMENTS (1997)
(citing one recent study of nursing home agreements in Massachusetts, concluding that "87
percent of the agreements improperly seek the signature of a 'voluntary responsible party,'
despite the fact such an agreement would provide no benefit to the resident, family mem-
ber or friend"); Katherine C. Pearson, Cooperate or We'll Take Your Child: The Parents'Fictional
Voluntary Separation Decision and a Proposal for Change, 65 TENN. L. REV. 835, 860 (1998) (ana-
lyzing so-called "voluntary" decisions made by parents in investigations by child protective
services).
56. See Holloway v. Riley's Oak Hill Manor, Inc., No. CA 02-74, 2002 WL 31259803
(Ark. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2002); Special Care Nursing Servs., Inc. v. Fox, No. 9460, 1998 WL
61902 (Mass. App. Ct. Feb. 9, 1998).
57. 2002 WL 31259803 at *1.
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paid by insurance, Medicare or Medicaid]."58 In neither case did it
appear the elder person signed or was able to sign the admission
documents. Applications for payment under Medicaid or
insurance sources appeared to have been made in both cases, but
were denied for reasons undisclosed in the opinions.
Despite the opposite outcomes, the approaches of the two
courts were similar in that they appeared to view the issue as pri-
marily one of simple contract interpretation, without regard to the
federal statutory restriction on guarantees. On a superficial level,
the two cases can be distinguished. In the Massachusetts case, the
granddaughter wrote "granddaughter (co-guardian)" on a line be-
low her signature, in a box that permitted her to identify her
"relationship" to the client.0 The court concluded that disclosure
of her "representative" capacity and the fact that she had been ap-
pointed by a court to serve as her grandmother's guardian
prevented the "Service Agreement" from being interpreted as her
61personal guarantee of payment. In the Arkansas case, there was
no written limitation on the son's role in signing the agreement,
making it easy for the court to conclude that "Holloway [the son]
breached an enforceable contract."62 More important, perhaps,
there was no preprinted line for him to clarify his role in signing,
thus virtually assuring that the preprinted characterization as "re-6S
sponsible party" would control.
In contrast to the California case discussed supra Part III.A., the
Arkansas court held the son liable on the contract language and
gave no legal significance to the son's testimony that he had signed
the agreements only after his mother was admitted to the nursing
home, and only because he was told he had to sign them to keep
his mother there, with no alternatives given."" The court, or per-
haps counsel while arguing the case, did not appear to recognize
fully the implications of evidence suggesting the facility insisted on
58. 1998 WL 61902 at *1.
59. See Holloway, 2002 WL 31259803 at *1 (noting that "Mr. Holloway was never able to
obtain any Medicaid assistance with regard to services provided by Riley's"); Special Care
Nursing Serus., Inc., 1998 WL 61902 at *2 (noting the contract provided the resident, or her
estate, would pay the charges to the extent that "insurance or government benefits" did not
pay).
60. Special Care Nursing Servs., Inc., 1998 WL 61902 at *1.
61. Id. at *1 ("[N]otwithstanding Special Care's inclusion of the words 'assume re-
sponsibility for and guarantee the payment' in paragraph 4, the contract is plainly one for
services and not one of guaranty.").
62. Holloway, 2002 WL 31259803 at *3.
63. Id. at * 1.
64. Podolsky v. First Healthcare Corp., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89 (Ct. App. 1996).
65. Holloway, 2002 WL 31259803 at *3.
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a third party's promise, thus creating a de facto mandatory guaran-
tee that violates federal law.
66
In other cases, the courts have struggled with the implications of
the contractual language, particularly where more distant family
members have taken the lead to assist the resident. For example,S 61
courts have appeared reluctant to hold a niece or a stepson liable,
while showing little sympathy for affluent-and possibly manipulat-
68ive-immediate family members. While one court refused to hear
parole evidence, concluding that the "clear and unambiguous"
meaning of the son's role as "responsible party" created joint and
several liability for his father's care,69 another court applied the
"doctrine of equitable estoppel" to preclude a nursing home's re-
covery from an estate where there were repeated reassurances
made to family members that the older person's care was covered
by Medicare. Citing the federal regulatory scheme, other courts
have refused to base their decisions solely on the contract lan-
guage, and in at least one case the court imposed a burden on the
nursing home to prove that the person signing a payment promise
as a "Responsible Party' was doing so as a volunteer.
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(c)(F) (A) (ii) (2000) ("[A] skilled nursing facility must ...
not require a third party guarantee of payment to the facility as a condition of ... continued
stay in, the facility."); id. § 1396r(c) (5) (A) (ii) (2000); see also discussion supra Part III.A;
Podolsky v. First Healthcare Corp., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89 (1996).
67. See, e.g., Daughters of Sarah Nursing Home Co., Inc. v. Frisch, 565 N.Y.S.2d 532,
533 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (finding that factual issues regarding niece's awareness of key
terms of contract at time of signing precluded summary judgment); Slovik v. Prime Health-
care Corp., 838 So. 2d 1054, 1058 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002) (noting that evidence of documents
signed by step-son as personal representative did not support conclusion there was contrac-
tual obligation to pay for step-father's nursing home care).
68. See, e.g., Southport Manor Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. Kundrath, No. CV91-0284958,
1994 WL 621895, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 28, 1994) (noting the son, "a highly educated
businessman, refused to cooperate with [the nursing home]" and holding the son, who had
signed as "responsible party" and "guarantor," liable for more than $30,000 in his mother's
unpaid nursing home costs, plus attorneys fees); Leonard Nursing Home, Inc. v. Kay, No.
45-1-2002-1242, 2003 WL 1571579, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 13, 2003) (holding son-in-law,
acting pursuant to power of attorney, liable for $158,278 in nursing home care costs, con-
cluding "[d]efendant undoubtedly impoverished [the resident] for personal financial
gain").
69. St. Francis Home v. Sharon, No. 93-0523, 1993 WL 388290, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App.
Oct. 5, 1993); see also Daughters of Sarah Nursing Home Co., Inc. v. Lipkin, 535 N.Y.S.2d
790, 790 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (holding son liable for unambiguous promise to pay as "re-
sponsible party").
70. In re Estate of Spencer, No. M2001-02187-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 31662349, at *2
(Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2002) (noting that the nursing home dealt with Medicare on prac-
tically a daily basis and would be expected to have much more knowledge of the rules and
regulations).
71. Manor of Lake City, Inc. v. Hinners, 576 N.W.2d 592 (Iowa 1998); see also Beach
Manor v. Dolsak, No. 44462, 1982 WL 5963, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 21, 1982) (finding
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In most of these cases, it appears the family member signed a
form document on behalf of an incapacitated older family mem-
ber, without planning on becoming the guarantor for that person's
nursing home care. Many admissions documents have language
• . 73
which is at best confusing and at worst misleading. As the court in
Podolsky v. First Healthcare Corp. noted, "admission of a close family
member to a nursing home ... is often an emotionally-charged,
stress-laden event."7 4 Even if the older person has done some fi-
nancial planning, it is the rare instance where a family as a whole
preplans for long-term care.75 Spouses are often in the dark-or in
denial-about resources available to pay for nursing home care.
Few children, much less grandchildren and other members of the
extended family, have any understanding of the elder parent's
plans or finances until well after the moment of long term care
crisis arrives. Most admissions to nursing homes have no involve-
ment by attorneys, despite the growing 6specialty of Elder Law to
provide legal assistance in this arena. Most admissions agree-
ments are signed b' family members in practical-if not legally
recognized-duress. And as most Elder Law practitioners know,
even the clients who come to them for legal advice often do so
only moments before-or after-the weekend's emergency that
781identifies the need for long-term care.
summary judgment improper because of issues of fact regarding signer's understanding of
admission agreement).
72. See cases cited supra notes 67-71.
73. E.g. Benson, supra note 55, at i (citing one study of forty-five nursing home agree-
ments used in Massachusetts, the reviewers concluded that "all ... agreements examined...
contained certain provisions that the facilities knew or should have known to be invalid or
likely to confuse or deceive residents and their family members .... "); see also Pearson,
supra note 32, at 141-42 (analyzing "Responsible Party" provisions in Pennsylvania nursing
home contracts).
74. 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 101.
75. Martin & Rourke, supra note 11, at 154 ("Americans have an unusually unhealthy
attitude toward death and old age, which may lead to our ambivalence and indecision about
long-term care.").
76. As one experienced practitioner observes, "A'nursing home admissions contract
constitutes a major financial commitment and has a profound effect on the resident's per-
sonal rights, yet many families do not seek an attorney's review before signing.... [Tihe
contract review can provide a context in which to review with the family questions about
financial (and possible Medicaid) planning, will, advance directives for health care deci-
sions, and the personal rights of the person about to become a nursing home resident."
Lawrence H. McGaughey, Reviewing a Nursing Home Admissions Contract, 68 N.Y. ST. B. J. 34
(Aug. 1996).
77. See, e.g., Podosky, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 101 ("The declarations of appellants and their
supporting witnesses depict close family members in times of great personal turmoil trying
to find a suitable facility to care for an elderly parent, or as in one instance, of an elderly
parent forced to find a nursing home to care for a critically-ill middle-aged child.").
78. See id. at 92-94 (describing numerous instances where nursing home admissions
were made under time pressures created by hospital discharge decisions).
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When signing admission documents, family members may as-
sume, wrongly in some instances, that the elder person's access to
Medicare, insurance, social security or retirement fund payments
will be adequate to cover the cost of nursing home care. While
Medicaid continues to provide the bulk of the financing for long-
term care for those without adequate income and resources, gaps
can occur in the availability of the resident's private means or pub-
80lic funds. One subtle question underlies the disparate court
rulings on liability of "Responsible Parties." Who should be ex-
pected to bear the risk of "loss" if public benefits or the resident's
assets are not forthcoming or available for the cost of nursing
home care?81
C. Implications of Contractual Promises to
Use Resident's Assets to Pay Facility
In the Holloway and Fox 3 cases discussed above, the decisions
turned on whether there was an enforceable, contractual promise
to pay as a principal or guarantor on the contract. In another re-
cent case, the issue considered was slightly different. In Sunrise
Healthcare Corp. v. Azarigian, an intermediate appellate court in
Connecticut considered whether a third party signer was person-
ally liable for breach of contract by failing to comply with a specific
promise to use the resident's resources to pay the nursing home. 4
The court concluded that a daughter, signing as "Responsible
79. Nathalie D. Martin, Funding Lang-Term Care: Some Risk-Spreaders Create More Risks
Than They Cure, 16J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'y 355, 356 (2000) ("Medicare does not
cover most home-health care or nursing home stays, and unfortunately, most seniors do not
know this.").
80. See, e.g., supra notes 56, 67-71. Compare Dempsey v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 756 A.2d
90, 95 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) (holding money transferred by husband into irrevocable
annuities disqualified wife for Medicaid), with Ahern v. Thomas, 733 A.2d 756, 771 (Conn.
1999) (holding money placed by resident into irrevocable trust did not cause disqualifica-
tion for Medicaid).
81. Martin, supra note 79, at 386 ("The simple reality is that long-term care is incredi-
bly expensive, whether it is paid for privately or publicly. Both of the currently available
options for spreading the risk of these costs, long-term care insurance and continuing-care
contracts, create their own financial risks. It is time to take steps to improve these options, as
well as create additional ways to spread the risk of long-term care.").
82. Holloway v. Riley's Oak Hill Manor, Inc., No. CA 02-74, 2002 WL 31259803 (Ark.
Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2002).
83. Special Care Nursing Servs., Inc. v. Fox, No. 9460, 1998 WL 61902 (Mass. App. Ct.
Feb. 9,1998).
84. Sunrise Healthcare Corp. v. Azarigian, 821 A.2d 835, 837 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003).
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Party," was personally liable for more than $75,000 in nursing
home expenses when her mother did not qualify for Medicaid.
5
The court observed that under the contract, the daughter had
816promised to preserve her mother's assets for nursing home care.
The daughter acknowledged the separate promise, but asserted
that federal Medicaid law made the promise unenforceable against
her personally, citing the language of Subsection (A)(ii) s7 as sup-
port for the proposition that the statute created an absolute bar on
personal liability for agents. " The Connecticut appellate court re-
jected this interpretation. 89 The court viewed the contract as
initially pledging no assets of the daughter, thus complying with
federal law.90 Rather, the daughter's liability arose only from her
failure to keep a separate contractual promise to use her mother's91
assets for the nursing facility's care, a promise the court viewed as
permitted by Subsection (B) (ii). 92
While the holding of the court in Azarigian makes an important
distinction between prohibited mandatory guarantees and valid
promises to use the resident's assets to pay for care, a close look at
the facts also raises concern about the court's conclusion that the
daughter was in breach of the separate promise. The daughter,
Vicki Azarigian, held a power of attorney for her mother, dated
February 1994. 9  She signed the nursing home contract for her
mother as "responsible party" and her capacity as power of attor-
ney was known to the nursing home from the beginning.94 The
daughter paid for the nursing home from private sources through
the end of December 1996.9 In addition she hired a private com-
85. Id. at 842.
86. Id. at 840 ("If the responsible party has control of or access to the resident's in-
come and/or assets, the responsible party agrees that these funds shall be used for the
resident's welfare, including but not limited to making prompt payment in accordance ...
with the terms of this agreement.").
87. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(c)(5) (A) (ii) (2000) ("With respect to admissions practices, a
skilled nursing facility must... not require a third party guarantee of payment to the facility
as a condition of admission (or expedited admission) to, or continued stay in, the facility.").
88. Azarigian, 821 A.2d at 838.
89. Id. at 840.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 840 ("The defendant's potential liability under the contract for an unauthor-
ized use of [her mother's] assets is analogous to a trustee's liability for unauthorized use of
trust property.").
92. Id. at 839 ("[Statutory] prohibition of third party guarantees does not, however,
prevent 'an individual, who has legal access to a resident's income or resources available to
pay for care in the facility, to sign a contract (without incurring personal financial liability)
to provide payment from the resident's income or resources for such care.'" (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 1396r(c) (5) (B) (ii) (2000))).





panion for her mother at the nursing home, at a cost of $31,760. 9,
Such steps are typical of a "spend down," using the mother's in-
come and assets to pay for her care until they are exhausted.97
Shortly after admission, the daughter also made gift transfers from
her mother's accounts totaling $49,691.25, apparently as part of an
estate plan that pre-existed the admission.98 Where transfers or gifts
are made from the resident's assets, the statute mandates a period
of ineligibility; a standard planning step is to await the end of an
ineligibility period before making an application for Medicaid.9
In March 1997, the daughter applied for Medicaid on her
mother's behalf. Medicaid benefits, once granted, would normally'
be retroactive to three months prior to the date of application.
More than a year after the mother's death, in March of 1999, the
state denied Medicaid, citing disqualifying "transfers" from the
mother's accounts "between November 1994 and January 1996." °101
(The two-year delay in the administrative denial was not explained
in the opinion.) It turned out that in addition to the expenditures
made by the daughter, which the parties agreed did not alone dis-
qualify her mother for Medicaid, the resident's husband had used
$285,000 to fund a trust in August 1995."' The opinion does not
discuss whether the daughter was aware of the trust, or its implica-
tions, when she signed her mother's admission contract.
96. Id.
97. Omar N. Ahmad, Medicaid Eligibility Rules for the Elderly Long-Term Care Applicant, 20
J. LEGAL MED. 251, 253 (1999) (describing spend-down process during pre-Medicaid appli-
cation period).
98. Azarigian, 821 A.2d at 837 n.2.
99. Ahmad, supra note 97, at 262 (describing effect of transfers, creating periods of
ineligibility for Medicaid). The ability to make certain gifts or transfers for less than market
value is a standard Medicaid planning process, although it is sometimes controversial. See
Allan D. Bogutz & Marshall B. Kapp, Debate 15: Should Older Persons Be able to Give Assets to
Family Members without Affecting Medicaid Eligibility?, in CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES IN AGING 160-
72 (Andrew E. Scharlach & Lenard W. Kaye eds., 1997); see alsoVINCENTJ. Russo & MARVIN
RACHLIN, NEW YORK ELDER LAW PRACTICE § 8:36, at 645 (West Group 2003) (discussing
practical and ethical concerns arising from Medicaid planning that exist for both the family
and the elder law practitioner and noting that "[i]t is not the function of the elder law at-
torney to discourage private payment. It is the function of the attorney to explain what
government benefits, such as Medicare and Medicaid, are available and how to obtain them
100. Azarigian, 821 A.2d at 837 n.2.
101. Id. at 837.
102. Id. at 837 n.3 ("The parties agree that, if the revocable trust had not been attrib-
uted to [the mother], she would have been eligible for Title XIX assistance."). The
resident's husband died in January 1996, close to the time of his wife's admission to the
nursing home. By the time the administrative denial was issued, both the father and the
mother had died, thus suggesting that "undoing" the trust was impossible. See id. at 837-38.
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The Azarigian case demonstrates an important point about the
potential liability of someone who signs the admission agreement
while serving as the resident's agent. Nursing homes need to be
paid in order to care for incapacitated persons. For practical rea-
sons, facilities need the cooperation of an agent to secure payment
from the resident's private funds or, when appropriate, to apply for
public funding under Medicare or Medicaid. The agent has a
significant role to play that requires financial savvy. Such practical
concerns are acknowledged in federal law, which expressly permits
qualified facilities to require "an individual, who has legal access to
a resident's income or resources available to pay for care in the
facility, to sign a contract (without incurring personal financial li-
ability) to provide payment from the resident's income or
resources for such care.' 0 4 Under the court's analysis in the
Azarigian case, the parenthetical prohibition on the signer's per-
sonal liability is treated as a reference to the prohibition on
mandatory guarantee contracts; it is not permitted to function as an
anomalous loophole for exploitation by agents.105
The Azarigian case is also troubling because rather than holding
the daughter liable for the portion of assets that she transferred as
"gifts," and that arguably were not used to care for the mother, the
court held the daughter personally liable for the entire sum
she "transferred," including the cost of the assistant hired to care for
her mother.1°6 Further, despite references to the daughter's
"misconduct," the court does not fully address the apparent good
103. See, e.g., Beverly Healthcare-Murrysville v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 828 A.2d 491, 496
(Pa. Commw. 2003) (holding nursing facility did not have standing to appeal denial of
Medicaid for former resident, where daughter, as designated agent, failed to pursue ap-
peal).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(c)(5)(B)(ii) (2000); id. § 1396r(c)(5)(B)(ii) (2000); see also42
C.F.R. § 483.12(d) (2) (2002).
105. See Azarigian, 821 A.2d at 840. The court notes that the agent's liability arises be-
cause of her handling of her mother's assets "and only to the extent that [the mother's]
assets would cover outstanding payments owed to the plaintiff. Because plaintiff seeks to
recover moneys that belonged at all times to [the mother] rather than to the defendant, the
defendant's liability depends on a showing of her misuse of [her mother's] assets in viola-
tion of the contract." Id.
106. Id. However, the court does appear to limit the daughter's liability to the amount
of money she transferred from her mother's 'assets:
The defendant [daughter] is liable only for her handling of [her mother's] assets
and only to the extent that [her mother's] assets would cover outstanding payments
owed to the [nursing home.] Because the [nursing home] seeks to recover moneys
that belonged at all times to [the mother] rather than to the defendant, the defen-
dant's liability depends on a showing of her misuse of [her mother's] assets in
violation of the contract.
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faith of the daughter in handling the mother's resources. The
daughter's transfers, standing alone, would not have disqualified
the mother for Medicaid. The court did not discuss whether the
daughter knew or should have known of the pre-admission trust
created by the resident's husband who appears to have been the
daughter's stepfather.
Although the court in Azarigian purports to hold the daughter
liable only for breach of her contractual promise to use the
mother's assets for nursing home care, the court comes close to
holding the daughter liable as a guarantor of payment. The daugh-
ter is forced to bear the risk that Medicaid would not be available,
even though her actions alone did not disqualify the resident for
eligibility.
IV. THIRD-PARTY SIGNERS AS AGENTS OF THE RESIDENT
In analyzing the potential roles played by third parties in facili-
tating nursing home admissions for the elderly, it is helpful to look
at the law of agency.08 Ordinarily, third parties signing admissions
agreements on behalf of elderly residents do so as agents; they act
with the consent of the resident, as principal, to make
arrangements for care. The authority of agents to act may be
107. Was the Connecticut court making a clear distinction between liability as a con-
tractual guarantor of payment versus liability for breaching a separate contractual promise
to use the resident's assets to pay for nursing home care? A test of the Azarigian court's hold-
ing would be created by facts that show ineligibility for Medicaid even though the
'responsible party" made no post-admission transfers of the institutionalized person's funds.
The court hearing such a case would be faced with the question of whether to hold the
third-party liable only because he or she signed the contract as a "responsible party." Re-
cently, in an unpublished opinion, a Connecticut court declined to impose liability on a
daughter who signed as "signature title party acting for resident (Conservator of Estate or
Power of Attorney .. .," but who did not put her name on the available line for "responsible
party." Gladeview Health Care Ctr. v. Grande, No. 566195, 2003 WL 22040626, at *1 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Aug. 7, 2003) (distinguishing Sunrise Healthcare Corp. v. Azarigian, 821 A.2d 835
(Conn. App. Ct. 2003)).
108. See WARREN A. SEAVEY, AGENCY 2 (1964) (noting the potential difficulty in using
brief terms such as agent and principal, "[in Agency, key words have been used by the
courts and text writers in so many different senses that it is especially important to state the
meaning assigned here"); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 cmt. b (1958)
(defining agent and principal).
109. See WILLIAM GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 34 (3d ed. 2001)
("Agency is a consensual relationship. The relationship is created only when one person
manifests an intention that another shall act in his behalf and the other person consents to
represent him. The relationship is most often thought of as being contractual thought it is
not necessary that the relationship arise out of contract."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
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actual" or apparent. Although the relationship is "often thought
of as being contractual ... it is not necessary that the relationship
arise out of contract."' A separate important issue, not directly
addressed here, is whether, and under what circumstances, thirdS. 113
parties should be allowed to make admissions decisions. For pur-
poses of this discussion, it will be assumed that the resident is not
contesting the admissions decision.
Ordinarily, an agent acting for a "fully disclosed principal" is not
viewed as a party to the contract. II4 Outside of the Medicaid con-
text, contracts signed by one person, requiring service for another,
may raise a legitimate question of whether the signer is acting as a
mere agent."5 Thus, traditional agency law puts the burden on the
signer to prove his agency. 6 On this point, courts frequently look
OF AGENCY §§ 1(1), 15, 16 (1958) (discussing the manifestation of consent between agent
and principal).
110. GREGORY, supra note 109, at 35 ("Actual authority may be express or implied. Ex-
press authority of an agent to act for his principal is manifested fully and specifically to the
agent. Implied authority may be incidental to a clearly expressed grant of authority or it
may be inferred, perhaps out of necessity or from the customs of a business, as attaching to
a recognized grant of authority."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 (1958)
("Authority is the power of the agent to affect the legal relations of the principal by acts
done in accordance with the principal's manifestations of consent to him.").
111. GREGORY, supra note 109, at 35-36. Apparent authority is also "sometimes called
ostensible authority." Id. Other applicable theories of agency law may include "estoppel,
inherent agency power and emergency authority." Id. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§§ 8, 27 (1958) (discussing agent's apparent authority).
112. GREGORY, supra note 109, at 34 (pointing out that the statute of frauds may re-
quire a writing with the authority to transfer real property, which is a major example of this
limitation); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 1(1), 15, 16 (1958).
113. As one observer notes following his qualitative research project, "[wihen any will-
ing and available family member or friend can be located, facilities typically accept that
person as surrogate decision-maker for the resident. Often there is no specific inquiry into
the source of that person's formal authority." Marshall B. Kapp, The 'Voluntary' Status of Nurs-
ing Facility Admissions: Legal, Practical and Public Policy Implications, 24 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM.
& CIV. CONFINEMENT 1, 10 (1998).
114. GREGORY, supra note 109, at 202-03 ("Whether or not an agent who makes a con-
tract for his principal thereby becomes a party to that contract depends upon the nature of
the particular agency relation out of which the contract arises. If both the existence and the
identity of the agent's principal are fully disclosed to the other party, the agent does not
become a party to any contract which he negotiates. Of course, it is otherwise if the parties
agree that the agent is to be a party."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 4(1)
(1958) ("If, at the time of a transaction conducted by an agent, the other party thereto has
notice that the agent is acting for a principal and of the principal's identity, the principal is
a disclosed principal.").
115. See, e.g., St. Luke's Nursing Home, Inc. v. Rebeiro, No. 1499,2003 WL 22048194, at
*2 (Mass. App. Div. Aug. 26, 2003) (noting that it is difficult to apply "straight agency prin-
ciples" to analysis of the role of third-party signers of nursing home agreements).
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 4(1) (1958); see also, id. § 320 cmts. a, b
(1958) ("Unless otherwise agreed, a person making or purporting to make a contract with
another as agent for a disclosed principal does not become a party to the contract.").
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to see whether the principal's identity was fully disclosed." 7 How-
ever, in nursing homes participating in Medicare and Medicaid,
the principal is always "disclosed" for it is the resident who has a
statutory right to seek federal payment sources, and the facility is
not permitted to seek a waiver of that right."8 Thus, decisions that
turn on whether the agent's limited role was disclosed are missing
the point of the federal law.' 9 In essence, the Nursing Home
Reform Act should be seen as creating a presumption-a pre-
sumption that the third-party signers are agents of the fully
disclosed principal (the resident), and are not agreeing to pay for
the resident's nursing home care out of their own pockets by the
mere act of signing an admissions agreement.
Where a document exists, such as a Power of Attorney, the
agent's authority is normally spelled out.'2" In some instances,
statutory law may impose specific duties on an agent acting under
a power of attorney. If a guardianship or other court-
appointment exists, the agent's duties may be specified by the
terms of the appointment or governed by statute. Ordinarily, the
agents and court appointed representatives are seen as having a
• . • 125
fiduciary obligation to their principals. While fiduciary obliga-
tions at common law are imprecisely defined, most analyses start
with the proposition that the agent is under a duty to act solely and
117. Seeid.§4(1).
118. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395i(3)(c)(5)(A)(i)(I) (2000) (Medicare); id. § 1396r(c) (5) (A) (i) (I)
(2000) (Medicaid); see also supra text accompanying note 25.
119. See, e.g., Holloway v. Riley's Oak Hill Manor, Inc., No. CA 02-74, 2002 WL 31259803
(Ark. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2002); see discussion supra Part III.B.
120. See, e.g., Karen E. Boxx, The Durable Power of Attorney's Place in the Family of Fiduciary
Relationships, 36 GA. L. REv. 1, 1-5 (2001) (examining history and use of powers of attor-
ney).
121. David M. English, The UPC and the New Durable Powers, 27 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.
J. 333, 337 (1992) (describing statutes affecting powers of attorney); see also UNIF. DURABLE
POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT, §§ 5-501 to 5-505, 8 U.L.A. 131 (Supp. 2003).
122. See UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP & PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT, §§ 101-504, 8A ULA.
310-428 (2003).
123. See Boxx, supra note 120, at 2 ("Analysis of the durable power of attorney can also
shed light on the broader question that has been open for centuries and is still vigorously
debated: what is the nature of a fiduciary?"); UNIF. DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT,
supa note 121, § 5-503 (discussing relationship between a fiduciary and an attorney in fact);
see also SEAVEY, supra note 108, § 3C ("A fiduciary is a person whose function it is to act for
the benefit of another with regard to matters within his undertaking.... The duties of loy-
alty are substantially the same for all fiduciaries, varying only in intensity."); GREGORY, supra
note 109, at 140 (citing the definition of fiduciary as someone who "occupies a position of
peculiar confidence towards another... ." (quoting Kinzbach Tool Co. v. Corbett-Wallace
Corp., 160 S.W.2d 509, 512 (Tex. 1942))).
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entirely for the benefit of the principal. 2 4 An agent can be held125
liable for misuse of his principal's assets, can be forced to make
an accounting to the principal, 1 6 and the agent must carry out the
terms of the principal's contracts (such as making payments pursu-
ant to the nursing home admission agreement) or be liable to the127
principal for damages arising from the failure to act. Under tra-
ditional agency theory, however, the failure of an agent to honor
the fiduciary duty to the principal does not ive the contracting
third party a cause of action against the agent.
Subsection (B) (ii) of the Medicare and Medicaid laws permits
the nursing home to ask a legally recognized agent to sign a con-
tract promising to use the principal's assets to pay for nursing129
home care. A potential conflict is created by such a clause in the
admissions agreement. Under traditional agency theory, the agent
must honor the principal's directions, or in the absence of specific
directions, act in a manner consistent with the fiduciary obliga-
tion to act solely for the benefit of the principal. 3 0 Thus, in
Azarigian, the daughter as agent for her mother appeared to be
acting pursuant to her mother's directions in making gifts in ac-
124. See, e.g., UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP & PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT, supra note 122,
§ 314(a) ("A guardian, in making decisions, shall consider the expressed desires and per-
sonal values of the ward to the extent known to the guardian. A guardian at all times shall
act in the ward's best interest and exercise reasonable care, diligence, and prudence.");
Susser v. Saari (In re Susser), 657 N.W.2d 147, 150 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that an
agent, acting under a power of attorney, is generally accepted to be operating in a fiduciary
relationship with the principal); Schock v. Nash, 732 A.2d 217, 225 (Del. 1999) (noting that
an attorney in fact has a fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of the principal unless the
principal consents to the agent's "engaging in an interested transaction after full disclo-
sure"); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 39 (1958) ("Unless otherwise agreed,
authority to act as agent includes only authority to act for the benefit of the principal."); 20
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5601 (e) (imposing express fiduciary obligation on agent acting
under power of attorney, thus supplementing common law).
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 402(1) (1958) (discussing an agent's liabil-
ity for misuse of principal's property); see also GREGORY, supra note 109, at 146 (describing
liability for conversion of property).
126. GREGORY, supra note 109, at 149.
127. Id. at 145-46.
128. Id. at 202-03 ("If both the existence and the identity of the agent's principal are
fully disclosed to the other party, the agent does not become a party to any contract which
he negotiates."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 4(1) (1958); St. Luke's Nurs-
ing Home, Inc. v. Rebeiro, No. 1499, 2003 WL 22048194, at *3 (Mass. App. Div. Aug. 26,
2003) (contrasting legal theory that agent of disclosed principal is not liable with evidence
that shows agent expressly agreed to personal liability for nursing home payments).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(c)(5)(B)(ii) (2000); id. § 1396r(c)(5)(B)(ii) (2000); see also 42
C.F.R. § 483.12(d) (2) (2002).
130. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13 cmt. a (1958).
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cordance with a pre-existing estate plan. Her payment for an
attendant was to benefit the principal.13 2 It was the admissions
agreement, in accordance with Subsection (B) (ii), that created a
priority list for the agent-to pay the nursing home first.11 Under
the Azarigian court's analysis of contractual promises to pay from
the resident's assets, even a third party who clearly signs only as
agent, and who works hard to satisfy his or her duties as the agent
for the institutionalized principal, faces the risk of substantial per-
sonal liability.
V. WHY PERMIT-MUCH LESS REQUIRE-A "RESPONSIBLE PARTY"
IN NURSING HOME AGREEMENTS?
A. The Difficulty of Medicaid Applications and the
Good (or Bad) Faith ofAgents
In 1986, the Institute of Medicine described the nursing home
industry as a two-tiered industry, made up of "a preferential one
for those who can pay their way and a second, more restricted one,
for those whose stays are paid by Medicaid." 13 4 In reality, the
industry has at least three tiers. One relatively small tier is made up
of purely private nursing homes, those who do not participate in
Medicaid; from day one the residents and their family members
know that any stay there must be privately financed. In those
contexts, the ability to request, or indeed mandate, guarantees is
not affected by the Nursing Home Reform Act. 136 At the other end
of the spectrum are facilities that often function as a place of last
131. Sunrise Healthcare Corp. v. Azarigian, 821 A.2d 835, 841 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003)
(rejecting daughter's argument that "she cannot be held liable under the contract because
she was acting as [mother's] agent").
132. Id.
133. See id. at 842 ("[T]he defendant assumed the obligations of the 'responsible party'
as set forth under the contract. These obligations extend well beyond the defendant's role
as [her mother's] power of attorney.... We conclude.., that the defendant, in carrying out
her obligations under the contract, was not acting exclusively as [her mother's] power of
attorney.").
134. IoM NURSING HOME REPORT, supra note 17, at 6.
135. There are approximately 17,000 Medicare and Medicaid-certified nursing homes
in the United States; statistics are not, however, maintained by federal authorities for the
number of purely private pay facilities. See NURSING HOME OVERVIEW, available at http://
www.medicare.gov/nursing/overview (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform); NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs.
136. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(a) (2000) (defining nursing facilities eligible for certification
or qualification to participate in Medicaid).
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resort, sometimes called "county homes," where the applicant's
income is minimal, and assets, if any existed, have long since been
exhausted; in such circumstances, from day one, everyone knows
that payment for care will be dependent on public financing.1
37
The vast majority of nursing facilities are Medicare and Medicaid
"certified" (also referred to as "qualified"), and comprise a
"middle" tier, where payment comes from a combination of private
and public sources.
Attorneys and others report that the availability of an open
space in the middle tier of nursing homes is often dependent on
the resident or the resident's family being able to show sufficient
private resources to pay the private pay rate for a given number of
months.,39 Medicaid beds are mysteriously "unavailable," while the
ability to pay at private pay rates assures admission. Thus, despite
the Nursing Home Reform Act's attempt to prevent manipulation
of families in the form of "guarantees" or waivers of the right to
seek Medicaid,14 a very real form of preferential treatment is prac-
ticed, affecting those of modest financial resources. Such sharp
business practices violate the spirit of the Act when viewed as a
whole. 14' However, both as individuals and as a nation, we continue
to be conflicted about whether care for our elderly should be a
public or private duty. Thus, such practices appear to be out-
growths of interpreting the federal laws as prohibiting mandatory
137. THOMAS D. BEGLEY, JR.& Jo-ANNE HERINAJEFFREYS, REPRESENTING THE ELDERLY
CLIENT (Aspen) § 3.08 (1999 & Supp. 2003) (describing types of nursing homes, services
and financing alternatives).
138. Id.
139. BEGLEY &JEFFREYS, supra note 137, § 4.04[B] [1] ("Many nursing homes certified
for Medicaid insist that the resident pay on a private-pay basis for a period of time before
becoming eligible for Medicaid. While the duration of stay element violates federal law, the
nursing home's refusal to admit a resident on a 'Medicaid on admission' basis appears to be
within the law. The practical affect [sic] of this anomaly is that nursing homes are able to
insist that families pay on a 'private pay' basis for a period of time."); Russo & RACHLIN,
supra note 99, § 12:4, at 777 (noting the "willingness to pay the cost of up to three
(3) months of care in advance can often make the difference between the acceptance or
rejection of the individual").
140. 42 C.F.R. § 483.12(d) (3) (2002); see also supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
141. See Russo & RACHLIN, supra note 99, § 12:9, at 786 ("As a practical matter, ...
since many nursing homes require three months payment as a condition of acceptance
of the individual, any payment violates the law whether it is called voluntary or not. This
creates a serious dilemma for many families who seek a nursing home placement, but
find no bed available unless they pay the security deposition."); see, e.g., 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396r(c) (5) (A) (i) (I) (2000) (prohibiting facilities from requiring residents to waive
Medicaid); id. § 1396r(c) (5) (A) (i) (II) (2000) (prohibiting facilities from requiring resi-
dents to promise not to apply for lower limits of coverage); id. § 1396r(c)(5)(A)(i)(III)
(2000) (prohibiting facilities from requiring third-party guarantee of payment as a con-
dition of admission, expedited admission, or continued stay in facility); see also discussion
supra Part II; BEGLEY &JEFFREYS, supra note 137.
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payment guarantees, while permitting so-called voluntary promises
to pay.
One consequence of this practice is the inability to predict accu-
rately whether and when someone will qualify for Medicaid until
after the bills have already begun to accrue. As many have de-
scribed, the regulatory framework and paperwork associated with
application for Medicaid assistance with long-term care is often
burdensome, chaotic and difficult.14 Denials of applications can
occur for highly technical reasons, such as failure to "verify" re-
sources, even if the possibility of certain resources would have no
effect on eligibility. Case law and practical experience further
demonstrate that despite federal guidelines requiring the states to
process applications for Medicaid in a timely manner, there is
enormous variability, both within states and from state to state, in
the total time it takes for final determinations, particularly if ap-
peals are involved.144 If a denial is issued, the time period to appeal
is quite short, and subsequent applications must sometimes be
made, creating potential gaps in coverage even for the "eligible."
1 4
As a result of such variables in the Medicaid application process,
very real financial traps exist for those who sign nursing home
agreements while trusting the superficial reassurances that the
third-party signers face no personal liability for the care.
142. Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43 (1981) (describing the statutory
scheme for Medicare and Medicaid benefits as one of the "most intricate ever drafted by
Congress"). See also Ahmad, supra note 97, at 279 (noting that the "unceasing attempts by
Congress to further refine the [Medicaid] program have, in fact, hampered understanding
of the law instead of clarifying it.... ."); Dobris, supra note 14.
143. See BEGLEY &JEFFREYS, supra note 137, § 10.03[B] ("Medicaid benefits may be de-
nied for the following reasons: improper transfer of resources; excess resources; improper
spend down; invalid trust; unacceptable annuity; or failure to be in need of nursing home
care.").
144. See 42 C.F.R. § 435.911 (2002) (specifying 90 days as the outside time limit for ap-
plications based on disability and 45 days for all other application bases, but providing
exceptions where the "agency cannot reach a decision because the applicant or an examin-
ing physician delays or fails to take a required action"); see, e.g., Sunrise Healthcare Corp. v.
Azarigian, 821 A.2d 835, 837 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003) (demonstrating twenty-four months
between application and decision); see also PA. DEP'T. OF THE AUDITOR GEN., PERFORMANCE
AUDIT OF PENNSYLVANIA'S MEDICAL ASSISTANCE LONG-TERM CARE AS PROVIDED IN NURS-
ING FACILITIES, ch. 6 at 2, Table 1 (1997) (summarizing 495 responses to 1996 survey of
Pennsylvania nursing homes indicating that 69.88% of Medical Assistance applications re-
quired more than 90 days for final decision).
145. See BEGLEY &JEFFREYS, supra note 137, § 10.03 (discussing application, denial, and
fair hearings that may be necessary because of disputes over interpretations of the facts,
available resources, or calculation of the community spouse's minimum monthly mainte-
nance needs allowance); see, e.g., Azarigian, 821 A.2d at 837 (describing application for
Medicaid made in March 1997 that was not denied until March 1999).
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The slowness of the Medicaid application process can give
greedy agents with bad motives the opportunity to misuse the
principal's assets. 146 Certainly, such agents should not be permitted
to avoid liability for their elder's care, and the contractual promise
permitted by Subsection (B) (ii) is an effort to curb such abuse. 147
However, some agents become caught in the Medicaid maze with-
out harboring bad intentions and despite attempts to qualifyS . 148
residents in a timely fashion for Medicaid. Unfortunately, in the
Azarigian case, the court rejected the daughter's assertion of her
good faith efforts as a defense and found that she failed to comply
with her obligations under the nursing home contract, without
clearly addressing her knowledge, or lack thereof, of the husband's
pre-admission transfers that triggered the disqualification for
Medicaid. 49 Although a showing of the agent's good faith permits
the agent to discharge his or her debt in bankruptcy, 15 few family
members will be likely to step forward to serve as agents if that be-
comes the dominant solution to problems with ambiguity and
surprise in nursing home contracts.
B. Some State Agencies Are Recognizing the Need for Better
Definition of Roles for Third-Party Signers
The request by nursing homes and other health care facilities
for persons to sign as the "Responsible Party" for a resident or pa-
tient is a practice that predates the Nursing Home Reform Act.1
5
1
146. See, e.g., Presbyterian Medical Ctr. v. Budd, 832 A.2d 1066, 1076 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2003) (finding that nursing home did not have cause of action for breach of contract
against daughter who did not sign nursing home agreement, but permitting nursing home
to go forward with a claim for equitable support and restitution under Pennsylvania's filial
responsibility statute, 62 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1973 (1996), where daughter is alleged to
have transferred more than $100,000 in mother's assets to her own accounts).
147. See42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(c)(5)(B)(ii) (2000); id. § 1396r(c)(5)(B)(ii) (2000); seealso
42 C.ER. § 483.12(d) (2) (2002).
148. SeeAzarigian, 821 A.2d at 837.
149. Id. at 841-42.
150. See, e.g., Lexington Health Care Ctr. of Elmhurst, Inc. v. Clarke (In re McDade),
282 B.R. 650, 652 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2002) (finding daughter's obligation to pay for father's
nursing home, arising out of her signature as "Responsible Party" on the nursing home
agreement, to be a debt dischargeable in bankruptcy, in the absence of evidence of fraud or
a fiduciary obligation running to the nursing home); Lexington Health Care Ctr. of Chi-
cago Ridge, Inc. v. Kraye (In re Kraye), Nos. 98 B 02693, 98 A 00941, 1998 WL 775654, at *3
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. Nov. 6, 1998) (finding son's signature as "Responsible Party" on father's
admission agreement did not create fiduciary obligation or otherwise prevent discharge of
debt for fraud).
151. See, e.g., Sturman v. Socha, 463 A.2d 527, 532 (Conn. 1983) (holding that son, who
was appointed conservator for his incapacitated father's estate, was nonetheless personally
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The practice has long been fraught with problems.52 As demon-
strated in the cases discussed in this Article, the phrase
"Responsible Party" is susceptible of alternative, inconsistent mean-
ings. Contract terms such as "representative" or "sponsor" are
equally vague, especially in the absence of statutes or regulations
defining their meaning. As it stands now, the terms are likely to be
viewed by family members as synonyms for "agent." For facilities
bent on ensuring payment sources, little incentive exists to make it
obvious to the signer that he or she is undertaking a voluntary and
knowing acceptance of responsibility for payment. It is apparent
from the case law summarized above that despite the existing fed-
eral statutes barring mandatory guarantee agreements, family
members are signing agreements without intending to become the
private source of payment, and yet are later asked to pay for long
term care.
One option for resolving the ambiguity of responsible party
contracts is for all facilities eligible to participate in Medicare or
Medicaid financing to eliminate vague party references or
phrases-and the vague payment implications-entirely. State
agencies are beginning to address this issue through review of con-
tracts currently used by nursing homes. For example, New York
recently entered into a stipulated settlement requiring a group of
nursing homes within its state to drop offending language and
practices. 53 Following a study of skilled nursing facilities in the
Boston area, an ad hoc working group prepared a report on nurs-
ing home admissions agreements for the Gerontology Institute at
the University of Massachusetts. Based on findings that the existing
agreements were likely to confuse or deceive residents and family
members, the Massachusetts group proposed a model nursing
liable for nursing home costs where he signed the nursing home agreement as "Responsible
Party" without identifying his limited role); St. Ann's Home for the Aged v. Daniels, 420
N.E.2d 478, 480-81 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (holding granddaughter liable for nursing home
costs because she signed as "Responsible Party" while assisting grandmother in transition to
nursing home, and holding son liable based on finding that son, who was away on a busi-
ness trip during the transition, appointed doctor as agent for making care arrangements for
his mother); Beach Manor v. Dolsak, No. 44462, 1982 WL 5963, at *2,(Ohio Ct. App. Oct.
21, 1982) (finding that issues of fact prevented summary judgment on liability for breach
where friend signed nursing home contract while serving as court-appointed legal guard-
ian).
152. Seecases cited supra note 155.
153. See NY State Attorney General's Office Gets Nursing Homes to Revise Policies, ROCHESTER
DAILY RECORD, Mar. 18, 2003, at 1.
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home agreement with standardized definitions for responsible par-
ties and similar third person signers.
15 4
Indeed, at least one state has eliminated the use of Responsible
Party language or similar ambiguous phrases in admission agree-
ments through state regulations. In Maryland, the Department of
Health and Mental Hygiene has approved two model contracts for
use in nursing facilities, and regulations mandate that "a nursing
facility shall include within its contract, at a minimum, all of the
provisions of the model contract. ' ' 156 Where the resident has capac-
ity to sign, one model contract permits the resident to list
alternative "anticipated" payment sources, including Medicare,
Medicaid, other third-party insurance, or the resident's own funds;
an alternative also exists for the resident to identify "another per-
son who has voluntarily agreed to pay with their own funds.' ' 7
A separate model contract is approved in Maryland for use by a
"Resident's Agent.",5 8 The agent contract is to be used if the agent
has "access to (use, management, or control of) the income, funds
and/or assets of [the Resident]" and is "willing to act on behalf of
the Resident.",1 9 The contract attempts to create alternatives for
the agent by distinguishing the agent's role as handler of the resi-
dent's funds, from any voluntary role as primary obligor for the
nursing home costs. The contract specifies that the agent "cannot
be required to pay for the Resident's care from [his or her] own
funds, unless [he or she] knowingly and voluntarily agree to pay
for the cost of the Resident's care with [his or her] own funds."'
The signature line expressly refers to the signer as "agent" and asks
the agent to specify whether he or she is acting as a court-
appointed guardian, a power of attorney, a family member, or
"other individual with access to (use, management, or control of)
the income, funds and/or assets of the Resident." 6' A separate,
154. JOHNJ. FORD & REBECCA BENSON, ESTATE PLANNING FOR THE AGING OR INCAPACI-
TATED CLIENT IN MASSACHUSETTS: PROTECTING LEGAL RIGHTS, PRESERVING RESOURCES,
AND PROVIDING HEALTH CARE Pt. IV, ch. 26, § 26.1 (Mass. Cont. Legal Educ., Inc. 2002),
available at Westlaw, EPAIII MA-CLE S-26-1 (copy of proposed model agreement on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); see also Benson, supra note 55.
155. MD. RGS. CODE tit. 10, § 10.07.09.06 (2003).
156. Id. § 10.07.09.06(B) (2003).
157. Model Resident Admission Contract, approved by Maryland Department of
Health and Mental Hygiene 2-3 (copy on file with the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform).
158. Model Resident's Agent Financial Agreement, approved by Maryland Department
of Health and Mental Hygiene (copy on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
159. Id. at l.
160. Id. at 2.
161. Id. at 18.
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eight-page questionnaire is an exhibit to the Agreement, seeking
the agent's acknowledgment of his or her understanding of various
rights, duties and limitations on liability when signing as an
agent. The explanations provided in the exhibit are intimidating,
thus encouraging caution on the part of the agent in signing the
agreement, although as the Podolsky case makes clear, the contexts
in which the documents are presented to the families are as impor-
tant as the superficial language of the documents.1
6 3
The authority of the states to impose controls on nursing
homes-beyond that contained in the Nursing Home Reform
Act-is expressly provided by federal law.16 In Podolsky, the court
recognized that contract provisions reciting the "voluntariness" of
anyone signing as a third party may be inadequate protection.",5 In
that case the court used the state's unfair trade practices law in an
attempt to force changes in the nursing home admissions process,
beyond merely changing the language of the documents. The
admission of a loved one for nursing home care is not a negotia-
tion among equals, and the need for regulatory control is clear.
167
The Nursing Home Reform Act represents a statement of national
policy precluding facilities from insisting on third-party promises
to pay. Time has demonstrated that additional protections are re-
quired to put teeth into that national policy.
VI. ABOLISH "RESPONSIBLE PARTY" LANGUAGE IN NURSING HOME
AGREEMENTS: A THREE-PART APPROACH
As it stands now, the continued use of "Responsible Party" lan-
guage to identify third-party signers is confusing, potentially
misleading to signers, inconsistent with the goal of federal law
162. Id. exhib.1
163. Podolsky v. First Healthcare Corp., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89, 101-04 (Ct. App. 1996).
164. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(c)(5)(B)(i) (2000) and id. § 1396r(c) (5) (B) (i) (2000)
(specifying that there is no federal preemption of stricter state standards for admissions
policies).
165. Podolsky, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 101-04.
166. Id. at 97 n.8 ("Because the federal statutes at issue do not include a preemption
clause and do not appear to occupy the field of nursing home regulation, application of the
California Unfair Competition Act to enjoy unfair marketing practices is proper."). See gen-
erally 61 CAL. JUR. 3D Unfair Competition § 7 (2003) (describing unfair competition as "a
broad and flexible doctrine").
167. See Charles A. Lattanzi, Nursing Home Contracts: Is it Time for Bad Faith To Come Out
of Retirement?, 6J.L. & HEALTH 61, 64 (1991-92) (observing that health care contracts are
frequently adhesion contracts where parties cannot bargain over terms).
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(even if not expressly forbidden), and is unevenly enforced. To
facilitate a clear relationship between facilities, families and resi-
dents that encourages families to remain active in their elder's lives
without fear of costly surprises, a more "responsible," three-
pronged response to the "Responsible Party" confusion is war-
ranted.
A. The Role of the Attorney
As demonstrated here, a review of nursing home collection
cases suggests that family members and their lawyers need to exer-
cise caution when presented with a nursing home admission
agreement that asks for a signature of a "responsible party." The
cautious lawyer may consider the following points when advising
prospective agents who are unable or unwilling to guarantee pay-
ment:
" When possible and appro~riate, only the resident
should sign the agreement;
* To test whether or not such provisions truly are
mandatory, and therefore improper, the third-party
signer should seek to strike out any provisions in
the contract that purport to impose an obligation as
a "responsible party" much less as an actual "guar-
,,169antor; ' 6
* When third-party signatures are provided, the sign-
ing party should clearly specify in writing, on the
admissions agreement, that he or she is signing in
the limited role as "agent for" or "guardian for" the
named resident;' 70 and
168. Having only the resident sign the admission agreement does not insulate agents
acting under a Power of Attorney or a guardianship from personal liability to the principal
for failing to use the resident's income or assets for the benefit of the resident. See e.g., 20
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5601 (e) (2003) (imposing fiduciary duty on agents under power of
attorney, including obligation to exercise powers for benefit of principal).
169. See McGaughey, supra note 76, at 35 (stating there is often a real, or perceived, ab-
sence of bargaining power for the families, "[elntry into the home is dependent on whether
or not the home chooses to admit the prospective resident").
170. In some jurisdictions, the agent must clearly state not only the agent's role but also
the name of the principal to escape personal liability. See Faith Manor v. Armer, No. 1-90-
115, 1991 WL 259567, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 9, 1991) (noting that it "has long been
held that an agent is personally liable on contracts executed in her own name, even if she
describes herself as an agent ... To escape liability, the agent must indicate the name of the
principal for whom she acts"). One experienced practitioner suggests that in New York a
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The third-party signer should be cautioned that de-
spite language in the nursing home agreement that
purports to limit liability to the resident's income
and assets, and despite signing as mere "agent," the
signing party faces potential claims for personal li-
ability for post-admission actions taken by the
signer if those actions can be characterized as a
failure to preserve and use the resident's income or
assets for the nursing home. This liability is differ-
ent and separate from any liability or non-liability as
a primary obligor or guarantor, regardless of the in-
terpretation given by courts to federal laws
prohibiting mandatory guarantees.
As Medicaid continues to tighten the belt on eligibility for long
term care, nursing home contracts are increasingly likely to be-
come the focal point for determining how care and financingP 171 . .
issues will be handled. Thus, it is important for experienced
Elder Law attorneys to assist the family members, not only in the
nursing home contracting process, but also in helping agents ma-
neuver through the maze of forms and timing issues associated
with Medicaid qualification for the resident, thus avoiding eligibil-
ity gaps to begin with. The nursing homes, the residents and the
familiesjointly benefit from sound Medicaid planning.
B. The Role of the Courts
Under present practices, where nursing homes frequently use
contracts with vague labels for third-party signers, there is often a
critical point in any collection suit when the nursing home seeks
summary judgment to enforce the "clear" obligation of the third
party to pay for nursing home care if other sources are
third party who does not have access to the resident's funds should sign, "'[the resident's
name], by: [third party's name], as representative'" in order to dovetail with New York state
regulations that define "designated representative" as someone to receive information and
participate in care decisions, as opposed to a "sponsor," defined in the regulations as some-
one who is wholly or in part responsible for the costs of care. McGaughey, supra note 76, at
35.
171. For example, nursing home contracts that require binding arbitration for resolu-
tion of certain disputes are now being used. See, e.g., Phillips v. Crofton Manor Inn, No. B
156570, 2003 WL 21101478, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. May 15, 2003) (discussing enforcement of
binding arbitration clause against family and "Resident's Representative" in claim arising
out of Alzheimer patient's escape from care).
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unavailable. Rather than treat the issue as one of simplistic
contract interpretation, courts need to be willing to inquire into
factual issues, including the circumstances that resulted in a third
party signing the nursing home contract for care."'
Where collection suits are filed against third-party signers,
courts need to be willing to recognize that nursing home admis-
sions agreements are not created by parties bargaining on equal
footing; rather they are usually contracts of adhesion signed by
parties under enormous stress, under circumstances ripe for ma-
nipulation by the nursing homes of the families as a whole.
However inartfully expressed, the federal statutes and regulations
do embody a federal public policy against families being forced to
serve as guarantors; at a minimum, federal law should be treated as
establishing a presumption against a third-party assuming an obli-
gation for payment, thus putting the burden on the nursing homes
to show fair practices attendant to the admission process.
C. The Roles of Federal and State Agencies
In an ideal federal system, the federal Medicare and Medicaid
statutes would be amended to specify more clearly that third-
parties signing nursing home admission agreements will be pre-
sumed to be acting as mere agents for the resident, and not as
obligors or promisors of payment out of the signers' own funds. To
the extent that anyone wants to "volunteer" to pay for another's
care at a Medicare or Medicaid qualified facility, a separate volun-
tary payment contract would be available for signing with a bold-
faced, express warning: "This contract makes the signer personally
liable for the costs specified herein and you are encouraged to
speak with an attorney or personal financial advisor before signing.
You are not required to sign this document. Federal law prohibits
the facility from asking that third parties sign this contract as a
condition of admission or retention of the resident in this facility."
172. See, e.g., Podolsky v. First Healthcare Corp., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89, 101-04 (Ct. App.
1996); see discussion supra Part III.A; Daughters of Sarah Nursing Home Co., Inc. v. Frisch,
565 N.YS.2d 532 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991); see supra text accompanying note 67; Manor of Lake
City, Inc. v. Hinners, 576 N.W.2d 592 (Iowa 1998); see supra text accompanying note 71. The
difficulty of summary judgment has been recognized in other contexts, where key issues
arise out of representations allegedly made by nursing home personnel to residents and
their families. See, e.g., Corley v. Rosewood Care Ctr., Inc. of Peoria, 142 E3d 1041, 1049 (7th
Cir. 1998) (reversing summary judgment in RICO case, to permit greater scope of discovery
related to representations about scope of care made by nursing home to families).
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Perhaps more important, the nursing home inspection process
created by federal law should include reviews of admissions con-
tracts and reports on the numbers of contracts to pay that are
signed by third-parties.171 If a high percentage of contracts are be-
ing signed at a particular facility, inquiry into the admissions
process would be warranted. In an age when families and residents
are spread throughout the country, a reliable national definition of
third-party liability is needed.
The current system is not ideal. Federal legislators and regula-
tors are consumed with the issue of cost containment in long term
care, not with fairness to individual families. As one observer
notes, "[v]igorous government enforcement of its own rules re-
garding third party liability for a resident's nursing home costs
conflicts with the government's compelling desire to drive down its
Medicaid expenses." 17 4 The states, however, must cope with the in-
dividual and class action suits that are inevitable responses to
inadequately enforced federal standards. The best hope for fami-
lies is that states will respond to the pressure of the growing
number of individuals and families who are potentially affected by
ambiguous contract terms and practices in the nursing home in-
dustries within their own borders. The precedent exists in
Maryland for states to create model nursing home contracts or to
mandate use of approved language, and in doing so to provide an
opportunity for all sectors affected by admissions issues to have
input in the pre-approval process.
At a minimum, states should:
* establish definitions for third-party signers, clearly
differentiating persons serving as agents for health
care decisions from the few who are willing to be-
come promisors, and mandate that only such
definitions be used for contracts;
* consider the adoption of four approved, model
nursing home agreements: one for signatures by
RESIDENTS only; one for signature by those who are
participating only as SURROGATE HEALTH CARE
173. See 42 C.ER. §§ 488.100, 488.105 (2002), for the existing framework for survey
team reviews.
174. McGaughey, supra note 76, at 35 n.9 (noting further that federal law does not re-
quire survey teams, as part of their obligation to enforce nursing home resident rights, to
review admissions contracts or enforce third-party payment restrictions).
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DECISION MAKERS; one for signature by AGENTS who
have legal authority to handle the resident's funds,
thereby becoming contractually obligated to use
those funds for the resident's care, as permitted by
Subsection (B) (ii); and one for persons, regardless
of their agency status, who wish to become
VOLUNTARY OBLIGORS OR PROMISORS of payment
for the nursing home care.
VII. CONCLUSION
Filial responsibility laws-and filial responsibility obligations
created by contract-are often attempts to impose legal obliga-
tions where moral obligations normally suffice. There is little
reason to have sympathy for a "bad apple" who signs a nursing
home agreement as a responsible party and then willfully ignores
the obligation to use the resident's private funds for the resident's
care. Active criminal conduct may be involved.7 ' But bad apples
(and the money) are rarely around for the nursing home to sue
once gaps in payment sources come to light. The worrisome suits
are those where a family member has agreed to serve as the agent,
has stood by the resident during the difficult days in long term
care, and has struggled to manage the resident's finances, only to
wind up facing an enormous, unplanned personal debt. As a prac-
tical matter, few community spouses, much less children,
grandchildren, nieces, or neighbors, can afford to volunteer for
such an open-ended and costly contingent liability-and federal
Medicare and Medicaid law should be recognized as establishing
the policy that they cannot be forced to volunteer.
175. In one noteworthy case, a husband and wife were convicted of theft and conver-
sion of more than $600,000 in assets, taken from their hundred-year-old great aunt. The
tools for the crimes were powers of attorney executed by the aunt, who was, fortunately, able
to testify at trial. Matt Miller, Couple Found Guilty of Theft From Relative, PATRIOT-NEWS, Sept.
20, 2003, at BI, available at 2003 WL 3218137.
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